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DENIAL OF ALIMONY TO SOLVENT WIFE
RICHARD CROUCH

The question: When will the wife's capacity for independent self-support allow a divorce court to entirely excuse a
transgressing husband from any obligation to pay alimony? In
Virginia the answer depends partly upon the character of that
capacity, for a distinction is drawn here between future wageearning prospects and the possession of independent property.
Substantial earning capacity will do it; in that respect at
least our Virginia rule is clear. Not in every case will steady
salary prospects for the wife result in an unencumbered break,
for of course the husband's circumstances are the primary consideration, but it can. The precedent is there. In a series of wellestablished cases, the latest of which is Baytop v. Baytop,1 the
rule has operated in favor of husbands whose conduct occasioned
the divorce.
In Baytop, the Court, in refusing alimony, cited (without
more) Babcock v. Babcock,2 a 1939 case wherein an aged and
infirm husband was not required to support a healthy young
wife. As the dissenting justice in Baytop pointed out, the result
was to extend the rule of Babcock to divorces from equally
young and healthy husbands, an area which he felt it ought not
reach 3
Mrs. Baytop was a colored school teacher. She must have
possessed in the Court's (majority) opinion, a'certain, degree of
stamina, for they noted that notwithstanding her physical inability to secure a job at the time, she certainly could always
get one.4 She had "the opportunity for employment."
What the Court usually calls "opportunity for employment" has been the controlling consideration in the other cases
through which the rule of Babcock has evolved: Barnard v.
1 199 Va. 388, 100 S.E. 2d 14.

2 172 Va. 219, 1 S.E. 2d 328.

3Supra, Note 1, at 395.
4Id,at 394.
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Barnard5 in 1922, and Hulcher v. Hulcher6 in 1941. In Hulcher,
discontinuance of alimony was refused on the distinguishing
point that here the wife did not have opportunities for employment.
But what of the wife whose post-marital source of independent
income is not her job potential, but a sizeable estate in property?
This involves us in a more interesting inquiry: first, as to what
the law now is, and second, what, as revealed by sister-state
decisions, perhaps it ought to be.
Initially, it must be said that a comparatively recent case,
Klotz v. Klotz seems to yield a rather definite rule: Property
holdings, be they ever so extensive, can never absolve a culpable
husband of wife-supporting duties. 7
Yet the Klotz opinion's dogmatic language notwithstanding,
a husband's attorney might still argue the opposite most convincingly. First, of course, the question lies within the realm
of equity jurisprudence where the particular circumstances of
individual parties are often of more importance than is precedent
-where the chancellor can render substantial justice with a flexibility wuch may quite permissibly, approach caprice.
More significant, however, is a matter which goes to the
very foundations of the new rule, if such it be, enunciated in
the Klotz decision. If the ruling here is new, it is not so labelled;
if it overrules an earlier holding, the justices do not say so. The
opinion does, however, appeal, albeit by nothing more explicit
than bare citation, to former precedent. Ring v. Ring,8 a 1946
Virginia case, is cited.
Now, until the time of the Klotz v. Klotz opinion, the contrary view as to what Virginia's law was seems to have prevailed.
Perhaps the best evidence of this prevalence, is a bar examination
question from the year 1961, identical to the question Klotz
presented. The answer given was:
5 132 Va.
6177 Va.
7 203 Va.
8 185 Va.

155, 164; 111 SE. 227.
12, 18; 12 S.E. 2d 767.
677, 127 SE. 2d 104.
269, 39 SE. 2d 471.
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The Court erred in granting alimony to the wife who
has independent means of her own which will enable her
to live as she has been accustomed to living. No public
policy is served by making it possible for a former wife
who has been relieved of all marital duties to live a life of
luxuriant idleness at the expense of her former husband even
though he was the guilty party in the divorce case. Alimony
is not given to punish the husband. See 199 Va. 388. 9
Note please that this is not put forth as the "probable"
answer to a so-far-unencountered question. Nor is it expressly
grounded in the Chancellor's broad discretion in tailoring his
justice to the individual case. No, it is blandly stated as the casesupported rule.
The question naturally and insistently then presents itself:
What could possibly have been the basis for this attitude on the
part of the Examiners, and the other Virginia legal scholars who
must have stood with them? Did those learned jurists see it as
a matter of natural justice so obvious as to be taken quite for
granted? Hardly. What then gave rise to this now declared
erroneous opinion? The first possibility of course is the case they
actually cited. Yet this turns out to have been only Baytop,
which, as we have seen, turned entirely on opportunity for
earning (Independent property was not once so much as mentioned, and hence is readily distinguishable here).
Since this analysis, if based upon an extension of Baytop to
the independent-property situation, was 100 per cent erroneous,
the question becomes post pertinent: What other precedent,
perhaps more valid although uncited, could have been present in
the Virginia legal mind? And conversely, why-if it was the
then existing law, and constituted the precedent for the later
Klotz opinion-was the case of Ring v. Ring ignored?
If the Ring opinion meant exactly what the 1962 court by
citation said it did, then it was either totally overlooked or
grievously misinterpreted in 1961. Yet a look at Ring itself dis9 Answers in form approved by the Examiners, supplied as part of Bar

Review Materials compiled by D. W. Woodbridge, Dean Emeritus
of Marshall-Wythe School of Law.
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closes all too readily its weaknesses as a foundation for the present
rule. There, the court's reaction to the problem was a wholly
negative statement-hardly intended, one would think, as furnishing anything but a negative precedent. The Court said:
... .There is no rule of law that requires her to expend
her estate to ameliorate the condition of Appellant, brought
about by his unfaithfulness to his marriage vows.'
The Court did not say that on the other hand there is a rule
which forbids the equity court to in its discretion take cognizance of a wife's estate or even "require her to expend" it. The
court in other words chose in this one instance not to consider
the adequacy of Mrs. Ring's estate, and since no rule of law
required that they choose otherwise, the choice was justifiable.
The court was being, in other words, discretionary. Discretion
might or might not "require her to expend . . . etc.", but no

inflexible rule of law required, and hence there was room for
discretion to be exercised. It is obvious, then, that this case
furnished no real indications that the position which the Examiners took would be in 1962 the wrong one.
The decision in Ring-irrespective of the dubious validity of
its interpretation in Klotz-is itself quite arguably correct. In
Virginia at least there is no "rule of law which so requires." One
obvious defect of Ring, however, is that it treats the question as
one of first impression-which actually it was not. And this
brings us to the case which provides the most promising answer
to our original question-what case law gave rise to the idea that
the wife's property is a relevant consideration?
Ultimately, it is Professor Phelps's textbook" which provides
the answer. Moreover, the book itself is evidence that the contrary 1961 attitude was generally persisted in right up to the
moment of the Klotz decision. The author's statement of the law
on this point is a single sentence-succinctly dispositive of the
matter under a rule which he obviously took to be long past
contention: "When a wife's estate is more ample than that of
lo Supra,Note 8,at 273-4.
11 Phelps, Arthur W., Divorce and Alimony in Virginia 2nd West Virginia.
Charlottesville: Michie, 1963.
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her husband, she may not be entitled to an award of permanent
alimony." ' 2 (Emphasis added.) The citation is to Myers v.
Myers, 13 a case wherein the wife was the very epitome of blamelessness, and the husband almost a caricature of "guilt."
Myers v. Myers was decided in 1887. Now this, not Baytop,
is precedent for the 1961 examination-answer. The court -here
refused alimony (disregarding entirely any question of employment capacity) because the wife had ample separate property:
But as the said Sarah J. Myers owns and possesses an estate
ample for the purpose, and much greater in value than that
owned and possessed by the said Albert J. Myers, it would,
under all the circumstances of the case, be inequitable to
decree-and this court refuses to decree-that the said Albert
J. Myers shall contribute to the support of his wife or of
his child. 14
It should be obvious from the above that the holding in
Myers rests upon the most permanent base which it could possibly
have-the Chancellor's broad traditional discretion. The statement that "it would, under all the circumstances,... be inequitable" creates, ultimately, a more durable precedent than would a
case declaring merely, "We so decide because this is the rule."
It is a precedent for flexibility. It invokes our concept of equity
in its classic role: a sensitive mechanism for maintaining constant
equilibrium in a structure which without it soon would topple.
As such, equity involves a process of perpetua innovation, yet
each innovation is characterized as a return to ancient principles
unconsciously veered away from.
Myers seems not to have been some remote and soon-forgotten abberation. Indeed, the indications are that its principlethat the Chancellor may decide to look or not to look to the
wife's material assets, as he sees fit-was always taken to be the
rule. If the negative implications of Ring are unpersuasive, take
for example, Hulcher v. Hulcher. Here the court refused to
discontinue alimony, distinguishing the other cases' 5 on the
' 2 Phelps, Divorce and Alimony ...§ 11-3, N.18.
1'83 Va. 806, 6 S.E. 630.
141d. at 815.
15 Le., Barnard and Babcock, Notes 5 and 2 supra.
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ground that here the wife was not capable of earning. Where
her separate property was brought up, the court dismissed the
argument with an observation that the matter was considered in
making :he original award. That is, the court explained, had
her proFerty not been so considered, the original award would
have beer larger. 16 Now certainly this affords no precedent for
the Klotz decision.
This much the cases prior to 1962 have in common: None is
productive of a rigid and therefore fragile rule. They all seem
to be founded on considerations more of ad hoc justice than of
precedent. The cumulative consensus, if such an historical fiction may be postulated, of Virginia Supreme Courts over this
period is apparently as follows-that a wife's possession of independent neans is a fact which may, but does not absolutely
have to be, considered in granting, denying or setting the amount
of alimony.1 7 In short, our present rule is an unacknowledged
and perhaps unconscious departure. If injustices, not to mention
occasional absurdities, are to be avoided, then the older and more
flexible may prove to be the wiser rule.
Indeed, if a dichotomy of employability and property ownership viust be made, it might be more sensible were the rule of
Klotz applied inversely.' 8 The justices who decided Myers
would certainly have thought so. It would not be extravagantly
unjust if one recognized purpose of the decree were to keep the
divorcee from having to work when" alimony can, and is necessary to, prevent it. And then if she were already so affluent as
never to be faced with the necessity of working, alimony or no,
the husband would not be burdened with an unjustifiable obligation to augment her affluence. This rule would rest of course on
the ancient assumption that women should not have to labor in
a masculine world for which they are too demure and delicate.
Yet this hardly compares with our present rule in relative absurdity: for under Klotz the propertied woman is conclusively
16 Supra, Note 6, at 18.
17 "In regard to the allotment of alimony, there is no fixed rule. It is a

matter within the discretion of the court." (Citing Bishop, Marriage
and Divorce §603, 1 Minor, Institutes 282-3, and Myers v. Myers)
Cralle v. Cralle 84 Va. 198, 203.
18 This was in fact the rule, certainly after Myers and until the Babcock
holding. (Phelps, Note 12, Supra, at p. 100, citing Harris v. Harris,
31 Grat. (72 Va.) 13, Miller v. Miller, 92 Va. 196, 23 S.E. 232).
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presumed a non-existent creature, and even a millionairess must
be considered destitute.
Now plainly, the matter is one of objective truth, and the
optimal rule would be one which incorporates no inviolable assumptions. The earning capacities of both the spouses and their
respective properties as well, should all be receivable in evidence.
West Virginia, in fact, has made this the law by statute.1 9 American Jurisprudence takes it to be the uncontroverted rule.20 So,
apparently, do the courts of Ohio, Kentucky and Kansas. 21 In
fact, the peculiar position of our 1962 decision seems never, if
seriously contended, to have been taken seriously enough for
judicial refutation.
The frank statement that our present standard for denial of
alimony is not what it should be, is a tempting one. In any event,
there certainly exist alternatives to the present rule, and the case
for any one of them might be easily made. One wonders just
how resilient the supposedly general rule of Klotz would prove
to be, given only slightly different circumstances. In short, the
point is quite profitably arguable.
One stone, of course, remains unturned: The possibility that
the Justices perhaps did not mean exactly what to all indications
they have said. That is, that the old discretionary rule was what
the justices attempted, however unsuccessfully to enunciate, and
what was in fact applied. Surely then the choice of language is
regrettable, for one sees in tracing the rule through its several
nuances of judicial alteration, how serial imprecision is compounded until misinterpretation is practically inevitable. In terms
of potentialities, the difference between "we know of no rule of
law" and "the law does not require" is not altogether illusory.
Slightly careless wording in Ring becomes dangerous, if not
totally derelict, wording in Klotz, to produce what may be altogether embarrassing words tomorrow.
19 W. Va. Code S 4715(1).
20 17 Am. Jur., Divorce and Separation §689.
21 Henry v. Henry, 157 0. St. 319 (47 0. Op. 189), 105 N.E. 2d 406; Oliver
v. Oliver 258 S.W. 2d 703 (Ky.); Field v. Field 343 S.W. 2d 168

(Kans.).
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Yet should this be a case of careless misstatement, and the
intended rule be not so general a one as is naturally supposed,
the wife who contends "the law will not and cannot require"
will probably be successful.
It can only be hoped that in the next such case, the court will
give this particular point the attention it deserves, and will reexamine conscientiously-i.e., by going back through cases farther
than the last one-the wavering line of its own decision. Then
the rule arrived at, as well as the disposition to be made of prior
holdings should be stated specifically and without equivocation.
Even if, as seems most advisable, this rule should be one of
broad discretion, then that itself could be explicitly set down.

